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Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty

Directors and officers of for-profit corporations are said to owe two duties to the
corporation: care and loyalty. But not so long ago, they also owed the corporation a
“duty of obedience.” This third duty, now largely forgotten, compelled corporate
fiduciaries to abide by legal norms—both those of the corporation and of external law.
In this essay, I argue that corporate law should revive (and may actually be in the
process of reviving) a “duty of obedience.” Explicit recognition of such a duty would
advance the legitimacy of the corporation in society. Moreover, such a duty recognizes
that the duties of care and loyalty are incomplete. Corporate actions that violate legal
norms, even when those actions are diligent and self less, are inconsistent with
fundamental expectations of corporate conduct.1
Recognition and development of an obedience duty would resolve much of the
confusion engendered by the “duty of good faith”—a confusion consistently identified
by the papers in this issue.2 It would offer a clearer vocabulary for those who counsel
corporate fiduciaries about their duties to abide by legal norms. It would provide a
principled basis for the judicial review of internal corporate controls and corporate
illegality.
The revival of the duty of obedience is not as big a stretch as might be imagined.
An obedience duty has a long-standing and continuing history for fiduciaries of nonprofit corporations. Non-profit trustees must abide by the legal restrictions that apply
to their organizations, such as those imposed by the non-profit’s constitutive
documents, any donor conditions, and restrictive tax law.
In thinking about various fiduciary cases in the for-profit corporation—many
forming the canon of corporate law jurisprudence—it is clear that judges accept the
duty of corporate actors to abide by legal norms. Thus, the articulated bases and
results in a variety of cases hinge not only on directorial care and loyalty, but also on
obedience. Were it not so, the corporation as a social institution would be in doubt.
Of course, not all disobedience by corporate actors rises to the level of a cognizable
breach of corporate duty—just as not all carelessness or disloyalty is actionable. Every
day, corporate decision makers make cost-benefit calculations that lead the corporation
to violate legal norms: the expected business benefits are perceived to outweigh the
expected legal sanctions. For example, a delivery service that double-parks its vans
makes a calculation that prompt customer service is more important than snarling
1.

See generally Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. Corp. L. 43, 57 (2008)
(distinguishing duty of obedience—to abide by limits of corporate charter—from duties of care and
loyalty).

2.

See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith in Revlon-Land, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 581 (2010–11)
(discussing the progression of good faith and explaining how the Delaware General Corporation Law
section 102(b)(7) “render[ed] uncertain the doctrinal status of good faith”); see also William W. Bratton,
Lyondell: A Note of Approbation, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 561 (2010–11) (explaining that “[t]he current
controversy regarding the good faith duty poses the questions whether the fiduciary standard of conduct
should be brought into congruence with prevailing standards of best practice . . . .”). See generally Renee
M. Jones, The Role of Good Faith in Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its
Edge, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 499 (2010–11); Robert B. Thompson, The Short, But Interesting Life of
Good Faith as an Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 543 (2010–11).
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traffic and risking fines. This is an inescapable aspect of living in the modern
regulatory state, whether as a natural or artificial person.
Any well-formulated duty of obedience that creates internal (as opposed to
external) norms of compliance must distinguish between reasonable corporate
decision making to accept the risks of corporate illegality and the effrontery of
pursuing an illegal course of conduct in the face of a clear, compelling legal command.
While the former may deserve the same judicial abstention implied by the business
judgment rule, the latter may well warrant the scrutiny and opprobrium of corporate
law triggered by a shameless interested transaction.
Moreover, any obedience duty must also distinguish between the remedy of
injunctive relief and one of personal liability. While ultra vires actions are today
typically remedied by non-damages liability, as when directors’ antitakeover
maneuvers exceed their powers, there may be circumstances when the threat of
personal liability may be necessary to ensure obedience to legal norms. The Caremark
duty, which compels directors to create systems that monitor corporate compliance
with legal norms, may represent precisely such a (mostly empty) threat.
In the end, recognizing a triumvirate of duties—care, loyalty, and obedience—
serves to further legitimize and guide the modern corporation in society. The duty of
obedience clarifies the role of corporate actors in ensuring corporate compliance with
internal and external norms; it gives courts and other lawmakers a roadmap when
faced with corporate illegality; and it offers a clearer vocabulary for those who advise
corporate fiduciaries. Above all, an obedience duty serves as a reminder of the
corporation’s exogenous effects.
This essay proceeds in three steps. First, I describe the wavering history of the duty
of obedience in the for-profit corporation, along with the duty’s relationship to the
ultra vires doctrine and thus the corporation as a social institution. Once a mainstay of
corporate law, the duty of obedience now resides implicitly within the duty of good
faith. Second, I look at how the obedience duty functions in the non-profit corporation,
where serving social norms stands as an avowed purpose. The internalization of limited
corporate purposes and external legal norms are well-established in non-profit corporate
law. Third, I describe how the duty of obedience in the for-profit corporation can be
and has been constructed, and suggest an explanation for many cases that fit only with
difficulty in the usual care/loyalty dichotomy. The duty of obedience properly focuses
the mind of corporate actors on their roles to ensure corporate legal compliance—and
thus the legitimacy of the corporation.
I.	DUTY OF OBEDIENCE IN THE FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION

A duty of obedience once occupied an established place in the for-profit
corporation. In his magisterial treatise on corporate law, Ballantine declared in 1946,
“Directors owe a threefold duty to the corporation. First they must be obedient.”3 A
more recent court, looking back, described the fiduciary duty triumvirate as follows:
3.

Henry W. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations § 62 (Revised ed. 1946) (focusing on the
duties of care and loyalty).
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The duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing ultra vires acts,
i.e., acts beyond the scope of the [authority] of the corporation as defined by its
[articles of incorporation] or the laws of the state of incorporation . . . . The
duty of loyalty dictates that a director must act in good faith and must not allow
his personal interests to prevail over the interests of the corporation . . . . [T]he
duty of due care requires [that] a director must handle his corporate duties with
such care as an ordinarily prudent man would use under similar circumstances.4

The duty of obedience served mostly as a natural corollary to the ultra vires
doctrine. Just as the corporation was prevented from acting beyond its powers, corporate
actors were obligated not to perpetrate such actions—and could be held liable if they
did.5 Although instances of personal liability were few, the threat was real.
Corporations, from the beginning and still today, are to engage only in “lawful
business” and thus are not meant to engage in illegality.6 Thus, the original ultra
vires doctrine not only set the boundaries of corporate power as established by
corporate norms, it also recognized that the corporation is powerless to violate noncorporate norms—that is, external law.7 The obedience duty called on fiduciaries to
not permit corporate illegality.
But as corporate law (and judicial review of corporate actions) moved from
questions of corporate power to those of fiduciary duty, the ultra vires doctrine
became largely vestigial—and its appendage, the duty of obedience, quietly wilted
away. Speaking as if at a memorial service, one commentator stated:
The first of these [fiduciary duties], the duty of obedience, is not conceptually
interesting and has not generated significant litigation in recent years. It
merely requires directors to comply with the pertinent provisions of the
articles, bylaws, and state statutory schemes.8

Today, only a handful of modern sources refer to the duty of obedience in the
for-profit corporation, usually as after-thoughts. No modern for-profit corporation
case has turned explicitly on the duty of obedience, though a couple of cases have
made clear that directors of a subsidiary corporation need not obey directives of the
parent corporation.9 More significantly, no Delaware court (the font of modern
corporate law) has ever invoked a “duty of obedience” in the for-profit corporation.10
4.

Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719–20 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting McCollum v.
Dollar, 213 S.W. 259, 261 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919)).

5.

3 Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations § 4019 (BancroftWhitney Co. 1895).

6.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2001); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.01(a) (2002).

7.

See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279, 1281–82 (2001).

8.

Robert J. Wilczek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 7 Del. J.
Corp. L. 221, 222 (1983).

9.

Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 Conn. J. Int’l L. 233, 253–54 (1999).

10.

Delaware courts have used the term “duty of obedience” in only five cases, none dealing with the duty
of a corporate fiduciary to obey corporate or non-corporate norms. See Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff,
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This is not to say that the obedience duty no longer exists. Recent courts referring
to the duty of care and the duty of good faith have made clear that corporate actors
cannot consciously violate—or permit the corporation to violate—corporate and
non-corporate norms. Beginning with the Allis-Chalmers case in Delaware, courts
and commentators have accepted that corporate actors may not choose to disregard
non-corporate norms, even when such disregard may be profitable for the
corporation.11
The landmark Caremark case, and the recent judicial foray into the duty of good
faith, makes clear that conscious, and even negligent, disregard for non-corporate
norms is antithetical to corporate law.12 The source of this “duty” to ensure corporate
compliance from which legal norms springs is unclear, but its existence seems beyond
question.
A. Original Duty of Obedience (Corollary to Ultra Vires Doctrine)

Corporate law in the United States began as the regulation of corporate powers.
Most early corporate law cases turned on whether the corporation was exercising its
powers according to the governing statute and its corporate charter. Most early
corporate law treatises devoted themselves extensively to questions of ultra vires.

870 A.2d 499, 509 (Del. 2005) (rejecting that directors of a subsidiary corporation must obey the
commands of the parent corporation); Foye v. N.Y. Univ., 269 A.2d 63, 71 (Del. 1970) (referring to the
duty of trustees of a non-profit corporation to follow corporate instructions); In re M&F Worldwide
Corp. S’holders Litig., 799 A.2d 1164, 1175 (Del. Ch. 2002) (referring to the duty of lawyers to obey
client directives); Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., CA No. 17350, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, at *61 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 8, 2000) (rejecting that directors of a subsidiary corporation must obey the commands of the
parent corporation); State ex rel. Richardson v. Swift, 30 A. 781, 790 (Del. Super. Ct. 1885) (referring to
the duty of foreign corporations to abide by the laws of the state in which they do business).
11.

See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006) (stating that directors breach their duty of good
faith if they “knew or should have known” of violations of law—in the case, suspicious bank transactions);
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (stating directors breach their
duties by ignoring “obvious danger signs” of illegal conduct—in the case, price-fixing by employees); In
re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that directors
breach duty of care for “sustained or systematic failure” to assure existence of reporting system to identify
illegal corporate conduct—in the case, medical referral kickbacks); see also William S. Laufer, Corporate
Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1350 (1999) (arguing that
“good corporate citizenship” has meant that “corporations simply purchase only the amount of
compliance necessary to effectively shift liability away from the firm”); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring
Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 719 (2007) (collecting and summarizing cases where
directors were alleged to have failed to monitor illegal corporate conduct or to ensure compliance with
internal corporate plans).

12.

See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959. This case, which arose from a settlement of allegations that directors
had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to oversee the corporation’s legal compliance system,
established a directorial obligation to ensure a “corporate information and reporting system” exists to
provide “timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board . . . to reach
informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business
performance.” Id. at 970; see also Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009); Stone, 911
A.2d 362; In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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In its heyday at the turn of the last century, the ultra vires doctrine provided
umbrage for shareholders who sought protection from management excess—whether
for acts beyond the power given to the corporation, acts that were illegal, or acts that
exceeded the authority conferred by shareholders.13 For example, corporate waste—
corporate expenditures lacking business justification—was treated as exceeded power,
not failed duty.14
Importantly, the ultra vires doctrine supplied a tool for ensuring corporate
compliance with non-corporate norms. As Professor Greenfield pointed out in an
article arguing for the revival of the ultra vires doctrine:
During the height of the ultra vires doctrine, a corporation’s illegal activities
were considered a subset of the larger category of ultra vires activities. In no
sense were corporations considered as having the authority to perform illegal
activities, even when performed to advance the interest of the firm.15

A commonly cited example of the application of the ultra vires doctrine—and its
corollary duty of obedience to enforce non-corporate norms—is the 1909 case of
Roth v. Robertson.16 There a New York court held directors of an amusement park
(Coney Island) personally liable for “hush money” paid by the corporation to avoid
prosecution for violating “blue laws” that forbade business on Sunday. The court
made clear that the payments were illegal, “bad in morals,” and ultra vires.17
The penalty in Roth v. Robertson, as well as other earlier cases in which directors
permitted the corporation to exceed its powers, was personal liability, not merely an
injunction against the corporate overreaching. As a 1901 treatise made clear: “All of
the authorities agree that if the directors . . . do or suffer to be done acts which are
beyond their powers . . . they may be compelled to make good on the loss.”18
B. Abandonment of the Duty of Obedience (Along with Ultra Vires Doctrine)

But then a subtle shift began in corporate law. Instead of talking about directors
being personally liable for their unauthorized actions, treatise authors began to talk
about the liability of directors for failures to act responsibly—a switch from power to
duty. For example, a turn-of-the-century treatise declared that if directors “attempt

13.

William L. Clark & William L. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations
§§ 204–05 (1901).

14.

See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336
(Del. Ch. 1997) (describing corporate waste as “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade[,]” thus serving “no corporate purpose . . . in effect a gift”)).

15.

Greenfield, supra note 7, at 1314.

16.

118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1909).

17.

Id. at 353.

18.

Clark & Marshall, supra note 13, at § 748 (citing numerous cases for the proposition).
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to act beyond their powers, they may be liable to the corporation for
mismanagement.”19
Another leading treatise marked the change from power to duty, observing in
1894 that “[n]o one can state with confidence what the law on [the subject of the
ultra vires doctrine] is at the present time, still less predict what it will be in the near
future.”20 In 1927, the same treatise would conclude that the liability of directors for
ultra vires acts is grounded on “violation of authority, or neglect of duty.”21
In 1946, Ballantine concluded that the duty of obedience was losing its force,
explaining that, although directors and officers were liable for exceeding charter
limitations on their authority, “the better view” is that they are not liable for damages
if their excess was “in good faith, without negligence on their part, or if they act[ed]
with the consent of the shareholders.”22 The language of power had been replaced by
that of duty.23
Knepper’s treatise of 1974, while echoing the existence of a triumvirate of
corporate fiduciary duties, doubted that directors could be personally liable for failing
to ensure corporate compliance with legal norms.24 Instead, the duty of obedience
had become simply a command—enforceable only by injunction to observe internal
corporate norms:
While directors have been absolved from liability for permitting their
corporation to engage in ultra vires acts, the general rule is that the duty of
“obedience” contemplates that ultra vires corporate activities are to be avoided.
Directors are supposed to contain their activities within the powers conferred
upon the corporation by its charter and within the authority conferred upon
them by the articles of incorporation and code of regulations. 25

Today corporate law treatises no longer mention the duty of obedience. 26 The
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, which in the 1980s sought to summarize
and guide U.S. corporate law, identified only the obligation of the corporation to “act
within the boundaries set by law”—a notion based on “the moral norm of the
19.

Id. § 693, at 2108.

20. Thompson, supra note 5, § 3999, at 2907.
21.

Seymour D. Thompson, Supplement of 1931 to the Commentaries on the Law of Corporations
(3d ed. Supp. 1931); Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations (3d.
ed. 1927).

22.

Ballantine, supra note 3, at § 65.

23.

Atkinson, supra note 1, at 61 (concluding that “reliance on the baseline fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty has tended to displace the doctrine of ultra vires in suits by shareholders against management”).

24.

William E. Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors (2d ed. 1973).

25.

Id. § 1.03.

26. Edward P. Welch et al., Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law (5th ed. 2010) does

not mention the term; Corporate Governance: Law & Practice (Bart Schwartz & Amy L.
Goodman, eds. 2009) is also silent. See generally David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation
Law and Practice (2009).
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obedience to law.”27 But the ALI Principles did not go further to specify a duty of
obedience for corporate actors, instead assuming only vaguely that shareholders could
enforce the corporate compliance obligation, presumably by an injunctive action. 28
The movement to see the corporation as private contract—and thus to delink it
from non-corporate legal norms—reached its zenith with the legal contractarians.29
Seeking to bury any notion that corporate law bound its actors to comply with noncorporate law, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel declared, “[m]anagers have no
general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to
the firm.”30 And those who saw the corporation as a board-centric team production
moved to bury any duty to comply with internal corporation norms. Professors Blair
and Stout declared that, while an agent owes an obedience duty to her principal,
directors in for-profit corporations “are not required to follow shareholder mandates
in any way.”31
Meanwhile, corporate law reforms were busy at work to ensure that corporate law
did not obligate corporate actors to comply with non-corporate legal norms. Courts
(and commentators) announced a “net-loss rule” that assumed directors who permitted
illegal activity could not be liable to the corporation unless the loss arising from the
violation exceeded any gains the corporation garnered from the illegality—namely, a
net loss.32 The assumption was that only “egregious law violations involving large
damages” could be actionable—though such cases never arose. 33
State indemnification statutes made clear that the corporation could indemnify
corporate actors against personal liability for a range of illegal acts. 34 State exculpation
27.

1 Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corp. Governance § 2.01, cmt. g.

28. See id. cmts. f–g (noting that the corporation’s obligation to observe legal norms “runs to the shareholders,

rather than third parties or the state”).

29. The legal contractarian theory:

implies a theory of the role of corporate law: corporate law should merely provide a set
of default rules that managers may adopt on behalf of their firms, while leaving
managers free to customize their companies’ charters with legally enforceable rights
and obligations. In the contractarian view, states are seen as competing with one
another to attract incorporations by providing corporate law that offers value-enhancing
default rules.

Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. Corp. L. 779,
780 (2006).
30. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev.

1155, 1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“Managers not only may but also should violate the rules when it is
profitable to do so.”).

31.

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J.
Corp. L. 719, 726 (2006) (identifying the limited power of shareholders to vote their shares to elect
directors and to sell their shares in the market for corporate control).

32.

Greenfield, supra note 7, at 1299 (citing sources that describe the rule).

33.

Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in
Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 413,
495 (1991).

34. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 1299–300 (referencing sources that describe indemnification statutes).
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statutes invited charter amendments to exculpate directors from personal liability,
except in Delaware for “acts or omissions . . . which involve . . . a knowing violation
of law”35 and under the MBCA for “intentional violation of criminal law.”36 But the
duty of obedience was not dead.
C. Revival of the Implicit Duty of Obedience (and Ultra Vires Doctrine)

The privatization of the corporation failed. The thesis that corporate actors must
ensure corporate compliance with internal and external legal norms is again wellestablished.37 Not only have courts returned to the ultra vires doctrine to invalidate
management power grabs—such as dead-hand poison pills and backdated options—
they have made clear corporate actors are bound to ensure compliance with
non-corporate legal norms. Corporate statutes also make clear that corporate illegality
finds no comfort under corporate law. For example, exculpation provisions in Delaware
corporations cannot absolve directors from personal liability for “a knowing violation
of law.”38
A revival of the ultra vires doctrine—and implicitly the duty of obedience—has
come as corporate actors have tested the outer limits of managerial power. Recent
cases limiting the power of the board to disenfranchise shareholders have used the
language of management power, as well as that of fiduciary duty. 39 Likewise, courts
looking at backdated options have chastised directors for both breaching their duties
of loyalty and disregarding plan limits.40 Implicit in both lines of cases is the notion
that corporate actors are bound to follow internal corporate norms.
Respect for internal corporate norms also undergirds the “reasonable expectations”
doctrine in the close corporation.41 The doctrine, by enforcing non-formalized
agreements of majority and minority investors, emanates from the duty of obedience.
Party expectations, akin to charter-like limitations placed on the controlling investor
at the behest of the minority investor, raise questions not of care or loyalty but instead
of obedience. The majority is bound to the parties’ expectations not because the
majority is inattentive or uninformed, or because it is necessarily acting selfishly
35.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2001).

36. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02(b)(4)(D) (2002).
37.

Melvin A. Einsberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del J. Corp. L. 1, 31 (2006) (“A well
established principle under the duty of good faith is that a manager may not knowingly cause the
corporation to violate the law, even when it is rational to believe that the violation would maximize
corporate profits and shareholder gain . . . .”).

38. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2001) (permitting corporate charters to limit personal

liability of directors to the corporation and its shareholders, except for “[a]cts or omissions . . . which
involve . . . a knowing violation of law”).

39.

See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1290–91 (Del. 1998) (holding that a
delayed-redemption poison pill was beyond the board’s statutory authority and its “concomitant fiduciary
duties”).

40. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007).
41.

See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. Law. 699, 702 (1993).
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toward the corporation, but because it has violated the agreed-upon internal norms.
As Professor Atkinson has noted, “the more fundamental duty of obedience is clearly
in play here. Once the minority has the majority’s commitment to a particular kind
of corporate activity, that commitment must be obeyed. Conversely, departures from
the specified corporate activities violate the duty of obedience.”42
The revival of a duty of obedience (though not labeled as such) has also arisen in
cases that call on corporate actors to ensure compliance with internal and external
non-corporate norms. The landmark case of In re Caremark International, Inc.
Derivative Litigation, built on a revived sense of the corporation as social actor, made
clear that corporate directors have duties to create and oversee compliance systems—
even when there may be no net financial benefit to the corporation.43 Then Ritter v.
Stone, though re-categorizing the duty from one of care to loyalty, confirmed the
fiduciary duty of corporate actors to ensure compliance.44
Admittedly, no case has imposed personal liability on directors for violating their
duty to ensure legal compliance. But that duty, now buttressed by the certification
and disclosure requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley,45 is not without normative content.
The threat of personal liability has spawned a whole industry in internal controls and
a corporate aversion to being seen as consciously disregarding legal norms.46
In summary, the duty of obedience lives. But lacking a proper vocabulary, courts
and commentators have gone in search for a category into which to fit it.47 While
Caremark said compliance was a matter of care and Stone v. Ritter said it involved
good faith, a subset of loyalty, the truth is that diligence and personal fidelity in
pursuit of legal compliance are simply aspects of obedience to law.
II.	DUTY OF OBEDIENCE IN THE NON-PROFIT CORPORATION

The duty of obedience has a clearer and more-established pedigree in the nonprofit corporation. It is regularly mentioned along with the duties of care and loyalty.
The legal literature devotes a good deal of attention to its contours and its place in non42.

Atkinson, supra note 1, at 62.

43.

698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

44. 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
45.

James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 237–38 (2003) (discussing
duty of obedience in tax context, which compels directors to ensure a non-profit corporation does not
engage in prohibited lobbying activities or participate in political campaigns).

46. Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
47.

As Professor Eisenberg has commented:

A manager’s obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to violate the law has
traditionally and properly been founded on the duty of good faith . . . [and] cannot be
founded on the duties of care and loyalty . . . . Trying to squeeze such conduct into the
duty of loyalty is like trying to squeeze the foot of Cinderella’s stepsister into Cinderella’s
glass slipper—an enterprise equally painful and fruitless.

Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 38.
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profit law. Court cases apply the duty to require non-profit actors to ensure compliance
with the non-profit’s mission, donative restrictions, and tax requirements.48
This is not surprising. The non-profit corporation exists to serve social purposes,
as embodied in both internal and external norms.49 Compliance with these norms is
not only central to the legitimacy of the non-profit corporation, but frames the duties
imposed on its actors. The non-profit vocabulary of “mission” and “trustee” suggests
the degree of obedience that non-profit fiduciaries owe to the organization.50
A. Scope of Non-Profit Duty of Obedience

The leading textbook on non-profit law explains that non-profit trustees have a
duty “to carry out the purposes of the organization as expressed in the articles or
certificate of incorporation.”51 The duty has been summarized as:
mandat[ing] that the board refrain from transactions and activities that are
ultra vires, that is, beyond the corporation’s powers and purposes as expressed
in its certificate of incorporation . . . . Thus, the director must follow the
purposes and powers expressed in the governing legal documents.52

The obedience duty therefore tracks and reinforces the non-profit’s mission—“to
act with fidelity, within the bounds of the law generally, to the organization’s
‘mission.’”53
Commentators have also pointed out that, beyond complying with internal
norms, non-profit fiduciaries also must ensure the non-profit complies with external
legal regimes “ranging from federal and state tax laws, civil rights statutes, and
antitrust laws which affect all organizations.”54 The consequences of non-compliance
by non-profit directors may be even more onerous than for their for-profit brethren:
48. See Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)

(quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. Corp. L. 631, 641 (1998)); see also Queen of Angels Hosp. v.
Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d
118, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Mass. 1986);
In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999)
(concluding that the “duty of obedience . . . mandates that a [nonprofit] board, in the first instance, seek
to preserve its original mission”).

49. See In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (blocking sale of hospital assets on

grounds that it would be inconsistent with the non-profit’s mission).

50. See Fishman, supra note 45, at 237 (noting that the duty of directors of non-profit corporations to be

obedient resembles the duty of trustees to be faithful to the wishes of the trust creator).

51.

James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Materials, 219
(3d ed. 2006). Curiously, the authors also assert that the ultra vires doctrine has been emasculated in
corporate law, perhaps understanding the doctrine to reach only corporate activities that conflict with
charter limitations. Id.

52.

Fishman, supra note 45, at 237.

53.

Goldschmid, supra note 48, at 641 (quoting Daniel Kurtz).

54. Fishman, supra note 45, at 237–38 (discussing duty of obedience in tax context, which compels directors to

ensure non-profit does not engage in prohibited lobbying activities or participation in political campaigns).
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A [non-profit fiduciary] can be held responsible if an organization violates the
law. For example, a director or officer is liable for a corporation’s failure to pay
taxes if she meets the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “[responsible]
person” and the failure to pay has been “willful.” Directors involved in dayto-day administration of the organization in matters related to taxes and
financial records are “[responsible] persons.”55

Some commentators even argue that the duty of obedience “is more basic,
[constituting instead] the foundation on which the duties of care and loyalty ultimately
rest.”56 Some courts echo the view, pointing out that non-profit directors must be
“principally concerned about the effective performance of the nonprofit’s mission.”57
Besides garnering attention from commentators, the duty of obedience has been
a mainstay of non-profit case law, both as a stand-alone duty and as a subset of the
duty of loyalty. A leading case, involving the proposed sale of a non-profit hospital,
turned on whether the sale furthered the “purposes of the corporation.”58 In describing
the duty to further corporate purposes, the court explained:
It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure
that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has
been referred to as the “duty of obedience.” It requires the director of a notfor-profit corporation to “be faithful to the purposes and goals of the
organization,” since “[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate objective
is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific
objectives: perpetuation of particular activities are central to the raison d’etre
of the organization.”59

The duty of obedience also requires compliance with the tax laws, which define
the scope and purposes of qualifying non-profits. As the leading non-profits casebook
explains:
The duty of obedience often arises in the tax context. Organizations exempt
from taxation under § 501(c)(3) . . . must be organized and operated exclusively
for certain approved purposes . . . . If an organization is operated for nonexempt purposes, the directors have violated their duty of obedience . . . .

55.

Id. at 238.

56. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 45.
57.

Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and
Proposed Reforms, 23 J. Corp. L. 631, 641 (1998)); see also Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 122 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1958); Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Mass. 1986); In re Manhattan
Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (concluding
the “duty of obedience . . . mandates that a [non-profit] Board, in the first instance, seek to preserve its
original mission”).

58. In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (blocking sale of hospital assets on

grounds that it would be inconsistent with the non-profit’s mission).

59.

Id. at 593 (quoting Victoria B. Bjorklund et al., New York Nonprofit Law and Practice:
With Tax Analysis §§ 11-04, 11-51, 11-52 (2d ed. 2007)).
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Directors should have in place procedures and systems that are likely to assure
compliance and enable them to monitor compliance appropriately.60

In short, while an explicit duty of obedience in the for-profit corporation
disappeared with the demise of the ultra vires doctrine—at least, in its old-timereligion form—the duty of obedience in the non-profit corporation continues to have
vitality. It guides non-profit fiduciaries in carrying out the mission of the organization,
consistent with the many legal regimes that non-profits inhabit.
B. Survival of Obedience Duty in an Age of Non-Profit Adaptability

The privatization movement has also seeped into the non-profit corporate world.
Just as the for-profit corporation is seen as a private adaptation to the business,
financial, and legal landscapes in which it operates, the non-profit corporation has
come under pressure to get with the times. Old missions must be updated, dead
hands must be buried, and non-profit fiduciaries must focus on the bottom line. As
a recent treatise author has explained:
To the extent the duty of obedience does not carry with it a duty to assure
that the trust is meeting contemporaneous needs, it does not set forth an
appropriate standard.61

Thus, the duty of obedience has come under attack for limiting non-profit
adaptability. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA), for
example, does not recognize the duty of obedience in the non-profit corporation,
apparently to create symmetry with its for-profit cousin.62 But rather than deny the
existence of a duty to comply with legal norms—the tack taken by the ALI Principles
for for-profit corporations—the RMNCA assumes the duty of obedience is subsumed
in the duties of care and loyalty.63
This conflation has both rhetorical and normative significance. By conflating
obedience with care and loyalty, non-profit fiduciaries are told that diligence and
personal fidelity are all that is expected of them.64 Removing obedience from the
60. Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 51, at 222.
61.

Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law
and Regulation 226 (2004).

62. See Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty

of Obedience To Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1485, 1522 (2003). Moreover, no non-profit
statutes specifically mention a duty of obedience, though many codify the duties of care and loyalty. See
Linda Sugin, The Increasing Resemblance of Nonprofit and Business Organizations Law: Resisting the
Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 893,
897 (2007).

63. See Sasso, supra note 62, at 1522.
64. See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls

for Further Regulation, 50 Emory L.J. 1093, 1140–42 (2001) (requiring duty of obedience, care, and
loyalty of each director of nonprofit organizations); Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit
Religious Organizations, 40 Cath. Law. 1, 20 (2000) (assuming duty of obedience is contained within
duty of loyalty).
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named triumvirate makes compliance with internal and external norms easier to
avoid—in the name of the non-profit carrying out the goals envisioned by current
managers.
Responding to the attempt to privatize the non-profit corporation, some
commentators have defended the importance of a stand-alone duty of obedience:
[I]nstead of being eliminated or collapsed under the umbrella of the duty of
care, the duty of obedience should be more clearly delineated as one of the
three fiduciary duties to which the not-for-profit corporate board is held,
thereby sending an important message to the sector that fidelity to the
institutional mission is critical.65

Some have argued that without a duty of obedience non-profit directors have no
unique duty substantially different from their for-profit counterparts.66 Not only does
this imply application of the business judgment rule to non-profit decisions, but “the
charitable corporation and the business corporation begin to look and act like each
other, regardless of rhetoric and tax status.”67
Looking at the “corporatization” of non-profit governance, a recent commentator
concluded:
[T]he law should include a legal requirement that directors commit themselves
to an organization’s charitable mission . . . . [S]ome legal requirement is
necessary and important because, without it, there is nothing in the law of
nonprofit governance that affirmatively requires directors to strive for
charitable goals. While loyal and careful governance, as those duties have
been defined in the business context, might further a corporation’s mission, I
am not convinced that they always will.68

Recent non-profit cases bolster the point. Consider the much-discussed MEETH
case, involving a non-profit hospital in New York City that proposed to sell its facility
to another hospital to be operated as a breast cancer ward and its additional land to a
private real estate developer, the proceeds to fund diagnostic and treatment centers
throughout the city.69 In reviewing the sale, as required by New York non-profit law,
the court faulted the board’s decisional process required by the duty of obedience.
The court pointed out that the board had failed in its duty by seeking to “monetize
the assets,” rather than to “serve the poor,” the hospital’s original mission.70
In short, the non-profit duty of obedience survives—despite recent attacks. The
duty to adhere to internal norms (or the non-profit’s mission) remains a mainstay of
65.

Sasso, supra note 62, at 1507.

66. Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance

Accountability, 46 Duq. L. Rev 99, 102 (2007).

67.

Id. at 102–03.

68. Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience Into Fidelity,

76 Fordham L. Rev. 893, 904–05 (2007).

69. In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 582–84 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1999).

70. See id. at 580–84, 594–95.
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the non-profit corporation, and the duty to comply with external law has not yet
appeared as a target on the privatization radar screen.
III.	REVIVAL OF EXPLICIT DUTY OF OBEDIENCE IN THE FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION

Does a duty of obedience in the for-profit corporation make sense? At one level,
the question is beside the point since corporate law already recognizes an implicit
duty of corporate actors to comply with internal and external legal norms. More
relevant is, first, whether corporate law should formally recognize such a duty and,
second, how its contours should be defined.
To begin this inquiry, it is useful to cast the duty of obedience in clearer relief.
The following diagram identifies the triumvirate of fiduciary duties and their
overlapping coverage, using a handful of canonical cases to illustrate their operation.
Fiduciary duties

Care

Loyalty

Obedience

Cases involving violations of corporate fiduciary duties:

1. Care only: Smith v. Van Gorkom (Del. 1985)
• v iolation of duty of due care (gross negligence) by directors for
failing to become informed about company value in a cash-out
merger. 71

2. Care/loyalty: Litwin v. Allen (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940)
• v iolation of duty of care (too much risk) by bank directors for
approving financial transaction with corporation having
conflicting ties to bank’s parent.72
71.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

72. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940).

471

Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty

3. Loyalty only: Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co. (N.Y. 1918)
• v iolation of duty of loyalty by director who failed to inform
fellow directors of risk to the corporation in entering selfdealing transaction with director. 73
4. Care/obedience: McCall v. Scott (6th Cir. 2001)
• v iolation of duty of care for failing to implement internal
controls that would have identified violations of Medicare and
Medicaid.74
5. Loyalty/obedience: Ryan v. Gifford (Del. Ch. 2007)
• v iolation of duty of “loyal fiduciary” for failing to comply with
shareholder-approved plan for issuance of executive stock
options.75
6. Obedience only: Roth v. Robertson (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1909)76
Miller v. AT&T (3d Cir. 1974)77
• v iolation of duty of obedience for approving bribes to operate
an amusement park illegally on Sundays.78

• v iolation of duty of obedience for failing to collect loan to
political party, in violation of campaign finance laws.79

7.	Care/loyalty/obedience: In Re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative
& ERISA Litigation (S.D. Tex. 2009)
• v iolation of all three fiduciary duties for creating off-balance
sheet entities while disregarding risks, for personal profit, and
in violation of securities laws. 80
***
Without the duty of obedience, the decision whether to implement a system of
internal controls would be subject only to the duty of care—and thus fall fully within
the board’s informed discretion under the business judgment rule. Without obedience,
the issuance of backdated stock options would involve the question of whether the
corporation had gotten its money’s worth—and thus be a matter entirely of value,
73. 224 N.Y. 483 (N.Y. 1918).
74.

239 F.3d 808, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2001).

75. 918 A.2d 341, 358 (Del. Ch. 2007).
76. 64 Misc. 343, 345 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1909).
77.

507 F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974).

78. Roth, 64 Misc. at 345.
79. Miller, 507 F.2d at 761.
80. 623 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
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divorced from the promises implicit in the corporation’s stock option plan. Without
obedience, the diligent and self less decision to violate external norms would be
entirely a matter of cost-benefit analysis—and again protected by the forgiving
business judgment rule.
The duty of obedience is the invisible “dark matter” of the corporate fiduciary
universe, its existence inferable by imagining the universe populated only by care and
loyalty as those duties are generally understood. The question then is how obedience
should operate when corporate actors must decide whether to comply with internal
norms, when called on to violate external norms, and when personal liability (as
opposed to declaratory or injunctive relief) is sought.
A. Obedience to Internal Corporate Norms

As the ultra vires doctrine has been rediscovered, in a more subtle and textured
form, so too its implicit duty of obedience. Courts speak about the limits on the
power of directors to adopt takeover defenses that undercut shareholder rights—such
as dead-hand poison pills and supermajority voting requirements.81 And, hand in
hand, directors bear a duty not to adopt such defenses.
Likewise, as corporate governance has shifted from conduct-based to disclosurebased regulation, corporate disclosures define new templates of corporate power.
Courts again speak about the limits of management power when norms implicit in
disclosure documents are violated—such as backdated options and other option
grants.82 And directors bear a duty not to permit such power excesses.
Although the line between limits imposed by power boundaries and those
imposed by fiduciary duties is sometimes blurred, recent cases make clear that the
ultra vires doctrine is still alive as an admonition to follow corporate statutes and
corporate-specific guidelines.83 And where directors stray from the template for
corporate powers, there is reason (and a long tradition) for corporate law to address
not only the corporation, but also its actors.
Although not yet openly tested, the duty of obedience to comply with internal
corporate norms waits in the wings not only to mandate a corporate outcome (through
declaratory or injunctive action), but also to impose personal liability on corporate
actors who would brazenly overstep corporate norms. That is, backdating options
again and again could well cross the line from poor judgment to bad judgment.
81.

See Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating “dead hand” poison pill
that could be redeemed only by the continuing directors in office when the plan was first instituted);
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (invalidating the bylaw that imposed
supermajority voting requirements as an impediment to the shareholder franchise and disproportional
takeover defense).

82. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (accepting allegations of bad faith when directors

approved backdated options that violated shareholder-approved stock option plan and fraudulently
disclosed their compliance with the plan).

83. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d

695 (Del. 2009); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001); Gifford, 918 A.2d 341; Carmody, 723
A.2d 1180.
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The directorial duty of obedience in this context, however, need not be entirely a
matter of on-off liability. It also serves an aspirational function, particularly in view
of the rising phenomenon of majority-approved shareholder resolutions. Although
corporate law generally constrains shareholders to phrase their views only as precatory
requests, not as mandatory directives, the question of what boards of directors are to
do with such requests remains open.
Certainly, just as politicians are politically compelled to consider polling data,
directors act at their own political peril by disregarding precatory shareholder
resolutions. The high incidence of directorial compliance with majority-approved
shareholder resolutions suggests that even if there is no legally-enforceable obedience
duty to abide by shareholder views, it is hard not to see an emerging and powerful
corporate cultural norm.84
Thus, like the duty of care, the duty of obedience should—and already may—
operate along a continuum. Blatant disregard for hard corporate norms (such as
statutory commands, bylaw requirements, option plan provisos, and undertakings in
disclosure documents) can lead not only to declaratory or injunctive relief, but even
personal liability in extreme circumstances. Disregard for softer norms (such as
precatory shareholder resolutions) constitutes the breach of an aspirational duty.
B. Obedience to Non-Corporate Legal Norms

Here, the duty of obedience is called on to do yeoman’s work. The ultra vires
doctrine and its duty of obedience were primarily seen as means to limit the
corporation to those activities envisioned first by the legislature and later by
shareholders—an internal function. Although the classic doctrine makes passing
references to compliance with non-corporate legal norms, this was not the original
function of the duty of obedience.
Perhaps, as some have argued, extending the obedience duty to non-corporate
legal norms goes too far. 85 The duty of obedience perhaps should be understood only
to reach compliance with internal corporate norms, such as statutory restrictions or
limits in the articles of incorporation. There are many problems with this argument.
For one, times have changed. Modern corporate law has moved ineluctably beyond
an internal ultra vires doctrine to one that also covers the corporation’s obligation to
comply with law—that is, one that addresses corporate externalities.
84. See Jason M. Loring & C. Keith Taylor, Empirical Study: Shareholder Activism: Directorial Responses to

Investors’ Attempts to Change the Corporate Governance Landscape, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 321, 321
(2006) (discussing the role and emerging importance of shareholder proposals).

85. If the duty of obedience were cabined, as some have suggested, to cover only compliance with internal

corporate norms (such as restrictions in the articles), recognition of a separate duty might be an empty
gesture. See Atkinson, supra note 1, at 63 (concluding that since internal norms are always modifiable by
the parties, the duty of obedience “involves nothing beyond garden-variety principles of the laws of
contract and agency”). But if the obedience duty reaches beyond internal norms, it becomes a positive
mandate requiring affirmative obedience—precisely the holdings of In re Caremark International, Inc.
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) and Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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As the ultra vires doctrine has lost its central role in controlling internal conflicts,
recognition of the corporation’s moral obligation to comply with law has become
firmly established. That is, while the doctrine has lost its preeminence, the obedience
duty has grown into a powerful (if unstated) premise of the modern corporation. The
obedience duty as fashioned by Delaware courts (and confirmed in Sarbanes-Oxley)
reaches well beyond internal corporate norms. As Caremark 86 and Stone 87 teach,
corporate actors face a positive mandate to ensure corporate compliance with external
law—a duty of obedience.
Also clear in the Delaware oversight cases is that the “net loss” rule, a natural
development in the corporation as private contract, is antithetical to the corporation
as a social institution.88 Even when illegality is profit-maximizing—either ex ante
based on expected costs and benefits or ex post based on actual results—the clear
consensus is that knowing violations of law are without corporate law justification.
Some have sought to explain the duty to ensure corporate legality on the ground
that many shareholders (presumably full human beings) would choose corporate
legality over corporate profits.89 But, more critically, whatever the shareholder views
on corporate legality, the corporation itself would lose its legitimacy if its governance
schema called on corporate actors to violate non-corporate legal norms in the name
of corporate profits. The corporation, as distrusted as ever, would lose its social
standing if it openly declared itself to be an unrepentant sociopath.
So why bother with a newly reformulated duty of obedience when existing
corporate duties (muddied as they are) seem to reach the same conclusions? Ultimately,
despite the value of clearer judicial analysis, the vocabulary of obedience has powerful
meaning. It communicates that the corporation and corporate actors serve within a
larger social and legal framework. It debunks the notion—as does corporate law—
that the corporation is merely a nexus of private contract.
C. Effect of Disobedience (Fashioning Internal Corporate Remedies)

Corporations invariably violate the law. Should corporate actors be personally
liable for allowing the corporation to violate internal and external norms? The
answer, thus far, has been almost uniformly no. Although judicial rhetoric that
directors are obligated to ensure corporate compliance is common, personal liability
is the great exception.
It is a big step from saying that corporate actors are bound to ensure corporate
compliance to saying they should face personal liability for failing to rein in corporate
86. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970–71.
87.

Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.

88. See generally Stone, 911 A.2d at 362; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);

Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959.

89. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76

Fordham L. Rev. 1769, 1784 (2007) (identifying corporate illegality as a category covered by the “duty
of good faith,” even when director and shareholder interests may not obviously diverge, since “[i]llegal
behavior may very well maximize corporate profits”).
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illegality. For this reason, perhaps, Delaware has avoided mention of an obedience
duty out of a concern of explicitly making corporate actors responsible for compliance
with non-corporate norms. After all, it’s a delicate balancing job to ensure the
legitimacy of the Delaware corporation, while limiting the responsibility of Delaware
corporate actors.
A duty of obedience even in the context of non-corporate legal norms, however,
need not imply personal liability for organizational illegality. As the Delaware courts
have made clear, personal liability can attach only when (even selfless) corporate
actors “consciously disregard” their duties, including their duty to monitor corporate
illegality.90 This would seem an acceptable compromise.
So like the duty of care, the duty of obedience may best be seen as largely
aspirational. Just as corporate law calls on directors to be informed and diligent, it
rarely finds sufficient fault in specific cases that would warrant crushing personal
liability. And just as corporate law urges directors to observe (and have the corporation
observe) corporate and non-corporate norms, directorial failures to obey have (mostly)
not deserved the blunt reproach of full personal liability.
Furthermore, internal and external law is convoluted. Any meaningful duty of
obedience cannot expect absolute compliance—perfection would become the enemy
of the good. Just as the obedience duty in the non-profit corporation may have some
room for adaptability, so too its non-profit cousin should give corporate actors a
chance to test limits. Nor should every instance of noncompliance with external
norms that results in fines or penalties against the corporation lead to personal
liability or even a rebuke in a non-damages lawsuit.91
Just as individuals, the elemental moral actors in society, have (or should have) the
freedom to make cost-benefit choices on whether to comply with legal norms, the
corporation should also have some latitude. Thus, while non-compliance might result
in penalties against the corporation under the applicable non-corporate legal regime,
such an outcome should not necessarily demand an internal corporate settling up.
The ALI Principles make this point, contemplating that the corporation need not
always comply with the law, when “the norm of obedience to law is . . . inapplicable or
counterbalanced by other norms.”92 For example, a public utility faced with the choice
of either shutting down its plant for failure to meet a statutory clean-air deadline or
continuing to generate electricity for the community it serves could choose, according
to the commentary in the ALI Principles, to not comply with the deadline.
Insights in structuring a for-profit duty of obedience can be gained from the
contours of the non-profit duty:
90. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
91.

Certainly, derivative suit procedures will filter out many claims of breach of the duty of obedience. See
Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DePaul L.
Rev. 729, 732–33 (1996) (asserting that although “the traditional business judgment rule is not applied
to shield directors from liability for intentional violations of law, the same result is reached indirectly
through . . . the so-called ‘net-loss’ rule [and the requirement of] a pre-suit demand . . . on the board of
directors, which may decide not to sue a director for past violations of law”).

92.

Am. Law Inst., supra note 27, § 2.01 cmt. g.
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The duty of obedience as suggested here gives both accountability and
flexibility to a board of directors. The definitions of “mission” and “purpose”
and the decisional process identified by the MEETH court give as much
predictive guidance to a board of directors as the business judgment rules
gives to the classical definitions of the duty of care and duty of loyalty. The
retention of a duty of obedience and the application of a prudential judgment
rule to a decisional process showing an evaluation of strategies to meet the
pre-established and published “desired effect” of the corporation’s activities,
create the frame of reference for the duties of care and loyalty. This is an
efficient and economical mechanism for public accountability.93

In the for-profit corporation, communicating to corporate actors that their
decisions must obey the law—subject, of course, to various ameliorating standards—
has important value. The duty of obedience is a clarion reminder that we live in a
well-ordered society of laws.
IV. CONCLUSION

The duty of obedience, once a recognized element of the for-profit corporate
landscape, continues to have aspirational and normative meaning. Whether in cases
applying the ultra vires doctrine to board decisions that stray beyond internal norms,
statutes that mandate internal controls, or articles exculpating directors except for
knowing violations of law, the duty of corporate actors to ensure legal compliance by
the for-profit corporation is imbedded in corporate law. Compliance with internal
corporate norms and external legal requirements is central to the legitimacy of the
corporation.
So why has the duty of obedience, as such, vanished from the corporate lexicon?
One explanation is that its original and principal function as a liability corollary to
the ultra vires doctrine disappeared with the demise of the full-blown ultra vires
doctrine. As the corporation has come to be accepted as an open-ended enterprise
and questions of corporate power have been displaced by questions of fiduciary duty,
the need for obedience-based liability dissolved.
Another explanation for the disappearance of obedience may come from the
(temporary) rise of the theory of the corporation as a “private contract” between
investors and managers. As such, corporate actors should owe no duties (beyond
those specifically imposed upon them by law) to ensure corporate compliance with
legal norms. But over the past two decades, a host of criminal sentencing guidelines,
statutory rules, and court-created norms has roundly rejected the theory.94 Today
corporate actors cannot disregard internal norms or external law—except at their
personal peril.
A final explanation for the disappearance of an obedience duty may be the
concern that such a duty would distort, and even displace, the external norms that
corporate law would be asked to enforce. For example, as illustrated by Miller v.
93.

DiPietro, supra note 66, at 132.

94. See supra Part III.B.
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AT&T, a hard duty of obedience applied to directorial non-compliance with campaign
finance laws might well lead corporate law to impose greater personal liability for
non-compliance than that envisioned by the campaign finance regime itself.95
All of this suggests that it may be time to recognize (and speak openly about) the
animating “ghost” behind such normative regimes as the “reasonable expectations”
doctrine, the binding nature of shareholder-approved compensation plans, the
organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and the Caremark monitoring duty. Corporate
actors unquestionably face “soft” duties to obey internal and external norms. Although
personal liability for breaching the duty of obedience may not be a significant risk—as
is also true for the duty of care—it nonetheless has real meaning.
The duties of care and loyalty—given the assumed contexts in which each
arises—lack the linguistic and narrative force of a “duty of obedience.” It is no
wonder, for example, that the Delaware courts have had such a hard time explaining
why directors should have a duty to monitor compliance with non-corporate legal
norms. Allis-Chalmers offered no explanation as to why directors were obligated to
pay attention to “red f lags” 96; Caremark told directors the duty of care required
corporate monitoring of legal compliance97; and then Stone v. Ritter decided the duty
of good faith, a component of the duty of loyalty, required a conscious regard for
legal compliance.98
The duty of obedience is part of the social contract of the corporation. The recent
(though implicit) acceptance of an obedience duty arises ineluctably from the social,
legal, and cultural acceptance of the “artificial person among us.” Just as we natural
persons cannot remove ourselves from our legal obligations, so too the corporation
and its actors derive their legitimacy from their duty to obey law.

95. 507 F.2d 759, 762–63 (3d Cir. 1974).
96. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
97.

698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).

98. 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
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